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Abstract
The development of security-critical large-scale distributed software systems is a diﬃcult and error prone
process. As we learnt from practical experiences, it is especially diﬃcult to manually deﬁne security policies,
for example for access control. A human security administrator is not able to cope with the high complexity
of the interactions of the application and the low level, platform speciﬁc security policy. Therefore, a new
approach is needed to ease the deﬁnition of appropriate security policies. This paper shows how realisation
of security aspects of a system can be automated to a great extend by applying model-driven software
development techniques not only on functional properties. In the presented approach, UML models of the
application’s functional properties are ﬂexibly augmented with security relevant information. Together with
a high level security policy deﬁned by the security administrator, this augmented functional model is then
used in an automatic model transformation to generate the platform speciﬁc security policy. With this
approach, which supports the separation of concerns in model based software engineering, we can auto-
matically generate security-critical applications for diﬀerent middleware platforms like SecureMiddleware,
which is an extended implementation of the CORBA Component Model with improved support for non
functional properties like security. The concepts, platforms and tools presented in the paper are currently
used for the development of several large-scale and secure applications, for example for building a Virtual
Air-Space Management System with strong security requirements.
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1 Introduction
Model Driven Development (MDD) turned out to be most useful for the develop-
ment of standard business applications. Many existing MDD solutions and tools
support this domain. However, the handling of the non-functional aspects like
Quality of Service, adaptability, assurance and security are mostly not suﬃciently
covered. In standard business applications, this is good enough; the existing MDD
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solutions are well suited to describe the structural parts of an application, e.g. com-
ponents, classes or interfaces. But often these solutions lack in easy to use support
of non-functional aspects.
Security, which is our main concern in this paper, is mainly implemented di-
rectly at the platform level, e.g. by conﬁguring roles. If this is not suﬃcient, e.g. if
more complex security policies have to be enforced, it has to be done as part of the
implementation of the business code. This, of course, is a large obstacle to one of
the main principles of component based software development, namely component
reusability. In such cases the component implements not only its business function-
ality, but also a hard coded security policy. The component can only be reused if
both the functional and the non-functional requirements match.
In recent years, more advanced middleware platforms became available, which
were speciﬁcally tailored to meet the demanding requirements like adaptability,
ﬂexibility, robustness and security (e.g. based on CORBA Component Model). In
contrast to standard business platforms, these new advanced platforms also oﬀer
support for a variety of non-functional aspects and allow separation of functional
and non-functional aspects at implementation level. Some of them follow a container
or capsule paradigm, which means the business functionality is implemented in a
component implementation, the non-functional aspects such as access control rules
are handled by the container, the component runtime environment.
Integrating MDA, UML and security is not a new approach. Jrjens deﬁned
UMLSec as an extension to UML, in order to model and verify secure systems, while
we use the functional model for the generation of security policies. Our approach is
more similar to Lodderstedt’s SecureUML. In SecureUML, UML is extended by Role
Based Access Control (RBAC). SecureUML allows an extension of UML models by
access control rules and provides a direct mapping to a middleware supporting
RBAC. We use similar concepts, but SecureMiddleware is not limited to a single
security model like RBAC. In SecureMiddleware, we use a more ﬂexible policy model
and evaluator, and are therefore able to support other standard security models as
well, for example Mandatory Access Control, or to freely deﬁne security policies
as rules on attributes. While SecureUML is very well suited for standard business
applications, where RBAC is the dominating security model, our far more ﬂexible
approach is required for applications in domains like defense, air traﬃc control or
ubiquitous computing.
Since the MDA approach improves the overall software development process so
signiﬁcantly, it would be most beneﬁcial to apply it also to the development of ap-
plications based on these advanced middleware platforms, with particular emphasis
on the non-functional aspects. Therefore, in this paper we describe the integration
of security as non-functional aspect into the overall MDA development process and
tool chain, which is used to build a virtual airspace management system with strong
security requirements, with respect to access control.
The paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 described the SecureMiddleware
platform, which is our target platform for the development of secure applications.
Section 3 gives an overview on how MDA principles are applied to functional and
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non-functional aspects.Section 4 explains the structure of the model-based tool chain
we have built to support development of secure applications in a platform indepen-
dent way. Section 5 describes an example on how we apply the presented approach
in the air traﬃc management domain. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Security in Component-based Applications
2.1 SecureMiddleware
Although in model-based development environment the speciﬁc properties of the
target platform become less important, a reliable and eﬃcient execution environ-
ment is still crucial for successful system development. The CORBA Component
Model (CCM) [1] deﬁnes a platform which is a good choice for developing large scale
distributed systems. It is based on the CORBA middleware and adds some more
advanced concepts, e.g automated deployment. It also simpliﬁes the usage of some
CORBA Services. The SecureMiddleware platform [2] we use for realizing systems
consists of an implementation of the CORBA Component Model called Qedo [3],
an extended Security Framework called OpenPMF [4,9] and both are based on top
of MICO, a CORBA ORB with enhanced security functionality [11].
Fig. 1. SecureMiddleware platform
CORBA is well accepted by industry in mission critical application areas like
Air Traﬃc Control, which is our target domain, because it is a reliable and mature
technology and many interoperable implementations of good quality are available.
CCM enhances the Object Model of CORBA. Figure 2 depicts the features a
CORBA Component can have. A component has a component interface (equivalent
interface) and a component home. The equivalent interface provides operations
for introspections and navigation regarding other components features; the home
provides operations to manage component life cycles and must be declared for every
component declaration. A component can provide a set of facets. A facet is a
named port providing a speciﬁc interface. Clients of this component call operations
on a facet. The facet’s counterpart, a receptacle, is a named port where a speciﬁc
interface can be connected to. A facet of a CORBA Component in server role can
be connected to a receptacle of a CORBA Component in a client role. Receptacle
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Fig. 2. Object Model of CCM
ports make dependencies to other interfaces explicit, which helps to minimize wrong
conﬁgurations and run-time failures by providing type safety.
As facets and receptacles are used for operational interactions (method invoca-
tions from other components synchronously), the event sources and event sinks are
used for event based interactions and message exchange (exchange event messages
with other components asynchronously). An event source can publish or emit events
of a certain type. Event sinks can consume events of a certain type. A similar port
concept for continuous interactions (i.e. data streams) is lately introduced by the
OMG to the CORBA Component Model. A stream source port produces streams
of data of a speciﬁc type while a stream sink port can receive such data. Attributes
can be used to conﬁgure an instance of a CORBA Component.
The CORBA Component Model has deﬁned the container model for providing
a high level of abstraction to the component implementation. It also oﬀers the pos-
sibility to load and to unload user code (components) dynamically by installing or
de-installing Homes. Depending on mechanism used by the container vendor and
programming language this is realized by loading and unloading shared libraries
and it requires sophisticated management of such artifacts at run-time. This is fa-
cilitated by the fact that the interfaces between the component implementation and
the container are standardised. The component implementation oﬀers a speciﬁc set
of interfaces to the container allowing it to manage the component implementation.
These interfaces are called Callbacks. On the other side the container oﬀers a set of
interfaces to the component implementation which enables the component imple-
mentation to make use of a certain container services. These interfaces are called
Internal interfaces.
An important feature of Qedo, which makes it in particular interesting for as-
pect orientation, is the possibility to extend the functionality of a system or of a
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Fig. 3. QoS Enabler in extension container
component without modifyiing implementation code but by installing QoSEnablers
in the run-time environment. A QoS Enabler is a specialized component that can be
loaded into a specialized CCM container and is able to hook in additional function-
ality. Taking this approach allows usage of plain CCM mechanisms for development
and deployment of QoS Enablers (see ﬁgure 3). Each QoSEnabler is responsible for
a speciﬁc QoS category. In our case, a QoS Enabler is used to handle security
aspects. The QoSEnabler concept is currently in ﬁnal stage of standardisation at
the OMG [16]. QoSEnabler may use an interception pattern to provide their func-
tionality. To make use of it a QoSEnabler registers interception interfaces at the
container. This interfaces are called Container Portable Interceptors (COPI). A
more detailed description of these platfrom speciﬁcs can be found in [5].
In the SecureMiddleware we used the QoS Enablers to enforce Access Control
policies. To make this possible on each relevant node a corresponding QoS Enabler
is instantiated in the CCM run-time environment. The management of the security
policies is accomplished by a policy management framework called OpenPMF. QoS
Enablers are in contact with OpenPMF at run-time to get updates on the security
policies that have to be enforced.
2.2 Policies and Policy Evaluation in OpenPMF
The OpenPMF Policy Management Framework was developed for the deﬁnition,
management and enforcement of security policy in large scale distributed systems.
Figure 4 shows an architectural overview of the OpenPMF framework. When the
framework is initiated, the technology-neutral policy, written in a policy deﬁnition
language (PDL), is loaded into a central policy repository. It is then obtained by the
diﬀerent systems, servers or applications and transformed into an eﬃcient internal
representation optimised for the evaluation of abstract attributes obtained from the
underlying security technology and platform. At runtime, each incoming invocation
triggers an evaluation process, after which the resulting decision is enforced on
the particular underlying platform. In SecureMiddleware, the policy evaluation is
done in an OpenPMF QoS Enabler for the components and in CORBA Portable
Interceptors.
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Fig. 4. OpenPMF Architectural Overview
OpenPMF is administered through the management daemon and the manage-
ment GUI. In addition, the policy violation detection daemon collects relevant infor-
mation from various layers of the underlying IT infrastructure and detects violations
of the security policy
The current way of specifying the policy is by using our human-readable, technology-
independent Policy Deﬁnition Language (PDL), which supports diﬀerent security
models. PDL uses concepts of the Principal Calculus [12] which theorises about
principals and its two diﬀerent privilege delegation relations.
PDL supports rules that are expressed in terms of requests and replies (i.e.
initiating invokers, intermediaries, actions, targets etc.). Some of the features sup-
ported by the language are wildcards, multiple sets, several (arbitrary) actions, sets
of clients/targets, groups and roles, and hierarchical nesting. PDL also provides
advanced support for delegation. The following is a short example of a security
policy deﬁnition using PDL, which allows the usage of 3 operations of the Account
interface for a client with the name TestUser:
policy /OS [*, *] {
policy /OS/Bank [*, *] {
(client.name == TestUser)
&(operation.name == deposit)
&(target.type == IDL:Account:1.0) : allow;
(client.name == TestUser)
&(operation.name == balance)
&(target.type == IDL:Account:1.0) : allow;
(client.name == TestUser)
&(operation.name == withdraw)
&(target.type == IDL:Account:1.0) : allow;
};
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};
In this small example of protecting CORBA interfaces, the deﬁnition seems to be
simple, because of the simplicity of the demo application. In complex real world
applications the security policies very quickly become long and complex, e.g. the
policy for a small CCM application is about 500 rules. While a single rule is still
simple, the vast number of rules makes writing them manually and later maintain-
ing them almost impossible. There are also dependencies between the rules, e.g.
between rules for protection at a server and a domain boundary, which makes the
manual rules deﬁnition even more diﬃcult for humans. Deﬁning security aspects
of an application by writing policies for access control in PDL also requires speciﬁc
knowledge of the platform speciﬁc details, to cover the internal communication of
the platform, e.g. for the deployment of components. With the work we presented
in this paper we want to beneﬁt from the Model Driven Architecture to greatly
reduce the complexity of writing security policies, i.e. by doing it in a platform
independent way and with a higher level of abstraction.
3 Applying MDA on Functional and Non-functional As-
pects
Why is the manual development of security policies so diﬃcult, even for skilled se-
curity and middleware specialists? The ﬁrst reason is the overall complexity of the
systems, both of the user components and the platform internal communications.
The second reason is that fulﬁllment of security requirements of the system is often
done during the later system development phases; security is typically integrated
into the resulting system in a post-hoc manner. Therefore, to make security man-
ageable, we need to reduce the system complexity the persons in charge of security
have to deal with and to improve the whole development process by providing ap-
proaches, languages and tools. Using model-centric and generative MDA approach
for development of ”security” systems brings following advantages:
• Abstraction and reduction of complexity: Security policies can be deﬁned and
integrated into system designs at a high level of abstraction; the human has only
to make the high level decisions and the ”hard work” is done by transformers.
• Well deﬁned and structured procedures help to avoid overseeing something, which
is in our experience more dangerous than making wrong decisions.
• High level models can be used to detect and correct design errors early in the
deveopment process.
The main goal of our work was to provide a MDA tool chain that supports
the rapid model based development process of security-critical software systems:
starting from deﬁnition of ”secure” system models in high-level modelling languages
like UML, then transform them automatically into ”secure” target system models
like CCM that can be used for further steps like code generation of CCM components
with security properties or plain security policy generation. In essence, apply MDA
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Fig. 5. Overview of the eUML metamodel
principles to functional and non-functional aspects in parallel.
The MDA tool chain and its components are described in the section 4. The
idea was not to implement the whole tool chain, but to select most suitable ex-
isting modelling and other tools used during the development process with target
platforms and combine these tools via model repositories in one open integrated
environment. The implementation work that should be done for the tool chain
is to reilize just model transformers and proﬁles to make it work. Artefacts like
metamodels, proﬁles and transformers play very importand role for our tool chain
realization. Metamodels provide means for management of models: all created
models are stored in repositories: in our tool chain repositories are automatically
generated from deﬁned metamodels.
To support visual modelling of domain-speciﬁc aspects domain-speciﬁc languages
or proﬁles are needed. To achieve the integration of diﬀerent modelling techniques
and for diﬀerent modelling layers (PIM, PSM), the diﬀerent repositories are in-
terconnected together by speciﬁc model transformers, which map models to other
models or to a programming or domain-speciﬁc language code.
As already mentioned, for system and security policy design we use the Uniﬁed
Modeling Language (UML) [13,14] as the foundation in our work. In fact, UML is
the standard for object-oriented modeling, many modeling tools support UML and
a great number of developers use the language.
Since UML 2 as a whole is a language with a very broad scope and has a less
precisely semantic deﬁnition (when it shall be used for automatic transformation or
code generation) we have deﬁned a subset of UML 2 together with a specialized and
absolutely clear semantics. This subset we called eUML (essential UML). The eUML
metamodel includes only the required UML 2 metamodel elements which formally
deﬁne modeling elements, their semantic and relations. The eUML metamodel con-
tains two main packages: Generic and Presentation as shown in ﬁgure below. The
ﬁrst package covers the generic modelling part (based on UML 2.0 metamodel) and
the second package includes additional concepts, which deﬁne graphical modelling
information of an UML element and UML diagram.
The Generic package contains the basic UML2 concepts grouped into the sep-
arate packages according to their nature. To avoid the ”package merge” overhead
found in the UML 2 speciﬁcation, most of the generic UML 2 concepts (for example
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Fig. 6. Overview of the eUML Generic package content
Class) are represented by a single element, rather than hierarchy of multiple ele-
ments having the same name and spread out in diﬀerent packages. This way seems
to be most practicable and is applied in the eUML metamodel throughout.
The Generic package contains following UML2 packages: Kernel, Components,
CompositeStructures, UseCases, CommonBehaviours, Actions, Activities and Re-
lationships. Figure 6 shows the dependency relationship of the packages.
The Presentation package based on UML 2 (Generic package) and extends meta-
classes like Element or NamedElement to additional graphical information such as
element dimensions, positions etc. The advantage of this extention is the ability to
store not only eUML model elements into repository, but also complete diagramms
with all graphical information.
Similar to UML, the eUML supports user-deﬁned UML proﬁles. We can extend
the eUML metamodel by using proﬁles to customize the language for particular
domain like security. For modeling our security policies we have deﬁned a small se-
curity proﬁle for eUML called eUMLSec. By using this proﬁle it is possible to model
the security aspect of a system additionally to the system design, for example Role
Based Access Control (RBAC) 1 . A role is a job or function within a system. The
role comprises all operations on a set of targets that can be executed from the user
(person or system component).To reﬂect this concept of a role, the proﬁle deﬁnition
includes a stereotype <<Security Role>> that extends the eUML metaclass Class.
In the section 5 we will give an example of the secure-aware system design.
With eUML we model our target security-aware system at a high level of ab-
straction, the implemented transformations are responsible for the generation of
security infrastructure for platform that supports RBAC and CCM. We need a
well-deﬁned metamodel for this platform to be able to transform eUML models
1 For the sake of simplicity, we use RBAC as an example. For other policies, like Mandatory Access Control,
we need additonal policies at the client side as well. Here another set of transformation is used.
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(PIM) into SecureMiddleware models (PSM). Since the SecureMiddleware platform
is an implementation of the CCM and OpenPMF, we have extended the CCM meta-
model [1], which is already deﬁned and standardised by the OMG. We have added
security concepts like RoleDef and PermittedOperation. We call this extended
metamodel CCMSec:
Fig. 7. CCM metamodel extension for security
The metaclass RoleDef inherits from the metaclass Container and contains
PermittedOperation that user with this role are allowed to execute. In our ap-
proach we design also an initial conﬁguration of component instances of an ap-
plication, which is called assembly. An assembly describes the initial conﬁgura-
tion of the application at run-time, it deﬁnes which component instance (metaclass
InstanceDef) to use, how many and how to interconnect them to each other. We
deﬁned an assembly as UML collaboration with component instances (see example
in section 5). Each component instance has ports deﬁned by corresponding compo-
nent (-type). To the ports (metaclass ConnectionEndDef), we added the required
security information (each port is represented as ”port name/role”, where the ”role”
of the incoming port gives the required role for the invocation).
The transformation deﬁned in our approach consists of multiple steps, because
the overall security policy of a component can be separated into two distinct parts.
• Infrastructure. The transformation starts with the implicit generation of the
security roles for the component infrastructure. This includes activities like de-
ployment and conﬁguration of component instances. This has to be done indepen-
dently from the application security policies. In pratice, these fully automatically
generated roles cover the largest part of the security policy.
• Component Instances. The next step is the transformation of security infor-
mation modelled in component assemblies. For this we derive from every associ-
ation of a role to a port of a component instance a security rule, which allows the
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comunication on this component instance port for client which are in this role.
For deployment process the policies resulting from the transformation are mapped
to the concrete platform, with now concrete security attributes like X.509 DN de-
scribing a component.
4 MDA Tool Chain
Our MDA tool chain has been produced for the rapid model based development
of CCM based security-critical software systems based on SecureMiddleware. As
already mentioned, it supports a platform independent modelling of systems, there
is no need to model, e.g., platform-speciﬁc data types, or to decide early in the
development process which particular platform to use. By using transformers, PIM
models can be automatically transformed into PSM models which then can be used
for further steps (e.g. C++code or security policy generation). The tool chain
is a set of modeling and other development tools with adaptations to additionally
support the security aspects; its architecture is shown in ﬁgure 8.
Fig. 8. Overview of the tool chain architecture
As already mentioned, we start modeling with the eUMLSec and use the eUMLSec
Modeller Tool, which is a Plug-In implementation for Sparx Enterprise Architect
[15]. This Plug-in is synchronized with the eUMLSec repository in both directions
(load and store of eUMLSec models), including the synchronization of graphical
information of the models stored in the repository. Furthermore, the eUML Plug-in
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contains dialogs and wizards speciﬁc for the eUMLSec language to specify details of
language elements. At this level, the model shall not contain any speciﬁc platform
dependent information.
The next step in the tool chain is to transform designed model into the plat-
form speciﬁc model, in our example the SecureMiddleware platform. As already
mentioned in this paper, SecurityMiddleware is an extended CCM implementation
provided by Qedo with security support provided by OpenPMF. Thus, we have two
additional repositories for further transformation steps: The CCMSec repository
for the management of platform speciﬁc information, and the Policy repository for
management of policies deﬁned in the platform. These repositories are synchronized
with Qedo and OpenPMF and are parts of the tool chain architecture.
The heart of our tool chain architecture is a generic control application compo-
nent which is used to manage and control the various components of the tool chain.
The whole management of repositories, transformers and models (serialize them to
the ﬁle system, incarnate them from the ﬁle system, import and export them to
and from centralized shared repositories, transform them to other models) is done
via the control application GUI. In the standard conﬁguration of the tool chain
control application loads three repositories: the eUMLSec, the CCMSec and Policy,
and two transformers: The eUMLSec2CCMSec and CCMSec2Policy. The list of
loadable tool chain components can be arbitrarily extended, we also can support
other speciﬁc technologies or platforms (e.g. J2EE) and transform eUMLSec mod-
els to new platform speciﬁc models. Such extensions require at least two new tool
chain components: a platform-speciﬁc repository and a transformer for eUMLSec
to platform-speciﬁc transformation.
The eUMLSec2CCMSec transformer transforms an eUMLSec model from the
eUMLSec repository into the CCM based speciﬁc model with security information.
This transformed model will be stored in the CCMSec repository after the trans-
formation has been done. The second transformer in the tool chain transforms
CCMSec models into the Policies stored in the Policy repository. After the last
transformation, the OpenPMF Policy Evaluators, here embedded in QoS Enablers
and CORBA Portable Interceptors, can obtain the security policy from the policy
repository and enforce it at runtime.
CCMSec models can be modiﬁed or completed (e.g. by adding deployment
information or other non-functional aspects like QoS) by using the Qedo Modeller
Tool implemented as an Eclipse Plug-In. The Qedo Modeller handles the connection
to the CCMSec repository to propagate models into the repository and also load
models from the repository and display them graphically.
From CCMSec models Qedo Modeller is able to generate the pre-generated
implementation skeletons, deployment descriptors and security policy description
(PDL) for the CCMSec model. After completing the business code implementa-
tion of pre-generated components the tool chain ﬁnally creates component and as-
sembly packages and loads generated policies into the central policy repository of
OpenPMF. After this step created components are immediately deployable and
executable on top of the Secure Middleware platform.
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Fig. 9. Extract from the ATM system design
5 Using the Approach in the Air Traﬃc Management
Domain
By applying MDA in our tool chain, we are able to generate automatically platform
speciﬁc security policies out of platform independent models. We present a simpli-
ﬁed and small fraction of a ”Secure ATM” (Air Traﬁc Management) system we are
currently working on to demonstrate this. The example deﬁnes four components:
Sensor, ControlWorkingPosition, AdminWorkingPosition and Actuator as outlined
in ﬁgure 9.
The Sensor component represents a radar station which sends data (Data) to the
ControlWorkingPosition component. The Sensor component can be controlled and
managed via the interface Administrate provided by the port control. The Control-
WorkingPosition collects and presents the data to ﬂight controllers, for example.
The Actuator component represents an example actuator that communicates with
the ControlWorkingPosition component via interface Command. The AdminWork-
ingPosition component manages components via the interface Administrate. Using
mentioned above proﬁle deﬁnition for Security we deﬁned following roles as stereo-
typed with <<Security Role>> UML classes (ﬁgure 10).
Fig. 10. Roles overview
The Controller role includes all ( all ) operations from the interface Command,
the role gives a permission to execute operations of the Command interface. The
same principle is for the role Administrator that includes all operations of the in-
terface Administrate, and the role DataComm enables Data signal based communi-
cation. It is of course also possible to select certain operations on a set of targets.
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As outlined in section 3 the deﬁnition of an assembly on PIM level is done by
using UML collaboration diagram. Figure 11 shows one conﬁguration of our example
application with some security information attached to it. In particular, the roles in
which the component instances interact which each other are attached to the ports
of the component instances. This collaboration diagram gives suﬃcient information
for the generation of securitypolicies which are enforced by the SecureMiddleware
platform.
The tool chain also automatically transforms the eUML component deﬁnitions
into CCM speciﬁc implementation skeletons, which allows the implementation of
the business code of the components. And also starting from the collaboration
diagram the tool chain generates deployment descriptors and component packages
which are later used for the automatic deployment of the application.
Fig. 11. Example Assembly
6 Conclusion
The Model Driven Architecture greatly improved the development of large scale dis-
tributed applications. In this paper we have described how the concepts of Model
Driven Development are applied to build a security aware tool chain, which allows
the platform independent deﬁnition of Air Traﬃc Management systems in conjunc-
tion with deﬁnition with security policies. Both, the design and the operation of
such systems greatly beneﬁted from such a security aware MDD based tool chain,
i.e. more rapid development and a higher level of safety is possible. The tool-
supported deﬁnition of security policies at a high level of abstraction reduces the
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complexity of the task of deﬁnition of security policies. The automated transforma-
tion of high level system and security models to platform speciﬁc artifacts greatly
reduces development time.
The presented tool chain is successfully used for the development of a secure
prototypical Air Traﬃc Control visualization application as part of the European
AD4 project [10]. The tool chain and the SecureMiddleware platform currently
supports two very commonly used security models, Role Base Access Control for the
invocation of operations and Mandatory Access Control for controlling information
ﬂow, but can be easily extended to other security models as well. In addition to
the generation of the rules for the component interaction, our tool chain is also able
to automatically generate the complex rule sets for the underlying infrastructure
daemons.
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